The first time I read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics over 20 years ago and every time I have read it since, I’ve been struck by what may appear to be one of Aristotle’s more casual comments, but which I have since come to see as a deep point about moral thinking in general.
For it is characteristic of a well-educated person to look for the degree of exactness in each kind of investigation that the nature of the subject itself allows. For it is evident that accepting persuasive arguments from a mathematician is like demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1049b24-26, translated by C. D. C. Reeve)
Aristotle doesn’t spell out exactly what he means, perhaps on purpose or perhaps because what we have from him are more lecture notes than polished texts. My thought is that according to the account of virtue he sets forth later in the text, Aristotle is well aware that his general account of virtue will not always tell you exactly what to do in any given situation. It’s not a decision algorithm (as modern Western theories like utilitarianism or deontology are sometimes thought to be). The vagaries of human life and specific situations will not allow any such thing.
Instead, Aristotle’s account of virtue is a general guideline for how to become the kind of person who generally knows what to do in specific situations. Virtue is a skill. He can’t tell you how to solve the trolley problem or how to be the most effective altruist, but he might help you become the sort of person who can solve such moral conundrums when or if they appear in specific contexts.
I think this is also a key to a defense against some kinds of moral relativism, because sometimes you’ll hear an oddly scientistic argument that because moral thinking is messy, imprecise, and unscientific, it must be relative – a conclusion that in no way follows if you accept that moral thinking could be both imprecise and non-relative.
Being Decent
But Aristotle’s insight about the inexactness of moral reasoning also helps me think through a moral theory I’ve been thinking about for a while: what matters most in ethics is being a decent human being.
I think this is also a key to a defense against some kinds of moral relativism, because sometimes you’ll hear an oddly scientistic argument that because moral thinking is messy, imprecise, and unscientific, it must be relative – a conclusion that in no way follows if you accept that moral thinking could be both imprecise and non-relative.
Being Decent
But Aristotle’s insight about the inexactness of moral reasoning also helps me think through a moral theory I’ve been thinking about for a while: what matters most in ethics is being a decent human being.